# Countering Block Withholding Attack Efficiently

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




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
# Proof-of-Work (PoW)



PoW in the white paper<sup>1</sup>


- Proof came from CPU power
- Majority attack Double spending

## Proof-of-Work (PoW)



- PoW in the white paper<sup>1</sup>
  - Proof came from CPU power
  - Majority attack Double spending
  - "The war of all miners against all miners"

# Proof-of-Work (PoW)



PoW in the real world

- Miners find efficient ways
- GPU and ASIC mining
- Pooled mining is a dominant approach

#### Attacks in PoW



- Selfish mining
- Block WithHolding (BWH) Attack
- Coin hopping

FPoW: 000000486

PPoW: <u>0000</u>821982

Submit


What is BWH attack?

FPoW: 0000000486

PPoW: 0000821982

Submit

What is BWH attack?




What is BWH attack?

## Recent study in BWH countermeasure

Property	Two-phase PoW	Pool entrance fee	FPoW centric reward policy
No loss	0	X	0
Compatibility	X	O	0
Fairness	0	O	X

So we still need a practical solution...



Our proposal : Detect & Punish

# Given information for mining task



- Version
- PrevBlockHash
- MerkleRootHash
- Timestamp
- Bits
- (Nonce)
- Transactions
  - Coinbase TX

# Our proposal



#### 1. Detection phase


- Put sensor miners
- Check mining task includes specific *coinbase*

# Our proposal



#### 2. Punishment phase

- Reducing the reward for the infiltration pool
- No blocking because of reentrance




Our proposal : Detect & Punish

## Discussion

Property	Our method	Two-phase PoW	Pool :: entrance fee	FPoW gentric reward policy
No loss	O	Ο	X	Ο
Compatibility	0	X	0	O
Fairness	0	0	0	X

# Scenarios against our method




Closed pools

Only approved miners can join

Multiple infiltration

# Scenarios against our method




Closed pools

Only approved miners can join

Multiple infiltration

Sensor coverage can be poor


#### Future Work



 Information share in mining pools should be studied more

- BWH attack
- Selfish mining ?
- Coin hopping ?


#### Conclusion



• BWH attack can be detected and punished efficiently

• Our method meets three conditions to be a good countermeasure

#### Reference



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- 2. Ittay Eyal. The miner's dilemma. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2015 IEEE Symposium on, pages 89–103. IEEE, 2015.
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# Thank you:)

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#### BACK UP SLIDES

#### What is BWH attack?

Total Computational Power = 1
Computational Power of Attacker = a
Computational Power of Victim = b
Relative Infiltration Power = t
Infiltration Computational Power = ta

$$Reward = \frac{(1-t)a}{1-ta} + \frac{b}{1-ta} \frac{ta}{b+ta}$$